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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

HENRY EARLY,

No. 7725

vs.
KARL L. JACKSON,
App:ellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from :a judgment entered June
13, 1951, (R. 6) in the District Court of . Salt Lake
County, Utah. Motion for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict was filed.June 20, 1951, (R. 8) and denied
June 22, 1951 (R. 9-10). N·otice of appeal was filed
July 18, 1951 (R. 11). The appeal is from the judgment
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and the denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The judgment was against defendant
Carl L. Jackson alone ~as the other defendant was
never served nor appeared. Consequently C.arl L.
Jackson is the only appellant. The case was one for
damages arising out of a highway accident near
Laketown, Utah, April 3, 1950. The pleas of the
parties (R. 1 and 4) were by way of negligence and
contributory· negligence and by this appeal the only
question raised is the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and judgment.
THE FACTS
No attempt ~11 be made here to review the testimony of the medical witnesses as the appellant concedes
it, together with other evidence in the record of damage
and injury, is amply sufficient to support the amount
of the verdict. So we proceed to the facts as we consider them material in view of the question r:aised by
this appeal.
The plaintiff testified he was employed at Laketown, Utah, by one Parnell Johnson, as a butcher and
truck driver (R. 96). On April 3, 1950 at about 7:00
or 7 :30 when it was dark the :accident complained about
took place (R. 85). The weather was clear, it had rained
that afternoon and the highway was damp. The high..
way was state highway 3, which runs generally east and
west. The highway was about 20 feet wide, had a hard
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surface and near the point of the accident a creek
crosses under it in a culvert from south to north (R. 99).
West of the culvert the highway is straight :and level
for approximately half a mile (R. 100). Shoulders of
three or four feet are on either side of the highway
(R. 101). Guard posts were in place on either side of
the highway near the culvert on the shoulders (R. 103).
From the edge of the highway is quite a steep slope
leading down to the creek (R. 104).
On April 3, 1950, plaintiff drove 'a truck along this
highway. He had a load of offal from his employer's
slaughter house in the bed of the truck and intended
to dump that offal into the creek (R. 105). He parked
his truck by hacking the same so the rear was over the
culvert, his rear wheels two or three feet off the oil.
The car pointed in the northeasterly -direction and the
front of the vehicle was about a foot from the center
of the highway (R. 106). After so parking he got out
of the cab and into the rear of the truck and started to
unload (R. 107). He heard a ear approaching :and looked
up and saw lights approaching from the west (R. 10911). He got back in the cab, attempted to start the truck,
but it w·ouldn 't start and then he got out of the cab and
ran down the north side of the highway waving his
arm (R. 111). He had left the lights burning on the
headlight beams. He thought he was 100 or 140 feet
west of the culvert when he heard the brakes screech.
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At that time he was at the north edge of the oil. The
next thing he knew he waked up in the hos~~ital (R.
113). The rest of his direct examination has to do with
his injuries and damages and we do not review it.
On cross examination he stated he had loaded the
truek at Laketown with offal from :animals slaughtered
that day (R. 124); that highway is a through stop
highway (R. 125-6); that he had been over the highw:ay
many times and the highway led from Garden ·City to
Montpelier, Idaho (R. 123-4). He identified exhibit 1,
a photograph, as a picture of the same type of truck
with the same type of body as the one he drove that
night. Exhibit 2 was also identified by the witness as a
picture with the camera pointed east and showing the
highway from a point west of the culvert and beyond
the culvert (R. 129). The posts shown in the picture
are the guard posts he spoke about on direct (R. 130).
He parked his truck with the hack end to the south and
the front toward the north with front nearly to the
middle of the highway (R. 131). He used a shovel to
push the offal off the truck into the creek. He had
turned the motor off but left the headlights on. He
had gotten out the driver's side, on the left, to get into
the bed of the truck (the side toward the west and the
side from which the automobile ap1>~roached (R. 133).
At the point where the creek crosses, and at the point
where he parked his truck, there was a six foot drop
to the creek (R. 137). He then testified:
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nlr. Earley, the manner in which you
parked your truck there that night effectively
blocked the eastbound lane on that highway,
didn't it!
Q.

A.

The south lane, yes sir.

Q. And anybody 'vho was using that highway, in order to get around you, had to get over
on the north side of the highway, on the westbound lane J? Did he not~

A. Yes sir.
Q. So you had parked your car entirely
across a main lane of traffic on that highway,
had you not?

A. Yes sir.
N·ow you didn't put any flares out on
either side of your truck, did you'
Q.

A.

No sir.

Q. You knew you were taking a big chance
when you parked a vehicle in that f:ashion, didn't
you'
A. Yes sir.
Q. And you kne\v that you were creating
a dangerous situation on that highway, didn't
you!
A.

Yes sir.

How long did you anticipate that it would
take you to unload your vehicle'
Q.

A. ;Oh, I would say four or five minutes.
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He testified !as he was shoveling his back was toward
the west (the direction from which the car approached)
(R. 139) that he heard the noise and saw the approaching
headlights he jumped out of the hack of the truck to
the ground and then got in the cab behind the wheel and
attempted to start the car (R. 140). All this time he
kept an eye to his left and saw the car app.roaching and
then he testified he had to do something else (R. 143)
and so he got out of the car and started running down
the highway waving his ~arms (R. 144). He testified:

Q. Now Mr. Earley, you knew that this
car, in order to get around your car, would have
to get over on the north half of the highway,
didn't you~
A. Yes sir.

Q. You knew that and appreciated it at
the time, didn't you~
A.

Yes sir.

Q. And yet knowing all that in your attempts to extricate yourself ·from this predicament you had put yourself in you went down the
north half of that highway~ Isn't that right'
A.

Yes sir.

Q. Right in the f:ace of that on,coming automobile, isn't that correct~
A.

Yes sir.

Q. Knowing full well that that man could
not proceed except by getting over in that lane'
You knew that, too didn't you~
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A.

I kne'v that man could stop if he would.

Q. You knew, too, that he could not proceed
except by getting over into that lane, didn't you'
A.

Yes sir. Yes sir.

Q. So you had blocked half of the highway
with your car, h~adn 't you'
A. Yes sir.

Q. And now you blocked the other half
with yourself, didn't you~
A. I would't say that, no sir.

Q. You wouldn't say that~ Well, you were
in the other half of the highway, running down
there pell mell, weren't you~
A. Yes sir.

Q. Waving your

arms~

A. Yes sir.

Q. You knew the highway was twenty feet
wide ; or thereabouts T
(No answer appears.)

Q. Did you think at the time the man Wias
doing seventy miles an hour~
A. I did, sir.

Q. And yet you expected him to
A.

Well, he could have done, I think.

Q. Y·ou expected him to
A.

stop~

stop~

Yes sir.
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Q. You
A.

did~

At seventy miles an hour?

Yes sir.

Q. And you got down 150 feet from where
this car was that you had parked.
A.

He could've seen my car.

Q. I didn't ·ask that. You got down 150
feet from where this car was ~~arked ~
A. Approximately.
Q. You had to give him some room to stop
in, didn't you~
A. Yes sir.
Q. And you knew very well that in attempting to stop of course he would turn to the left so
that if he didn't stop he would ~at least avoid the
parked truck~ You knew that, didn't you~
A.

No sir, I didn't.

Q.

You didn't know?

A.

Of anything at the time.

Q. You thought he would go, just go along
straight and stop 1a couple of inches from your
truck? Is that what you thought~

did

A.

I was in hopes he would.

Q.

He showed no perceptible slowing down,

he~

A.

No.

Q.

As far as you observed?

A. No sir.
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Q.

And yet you expected him to stop'

A.

I was in hopes of it.

Q. Yes, you were in hopes of it. Why didn't
you get entirely off of the highway1
A.

You ·couldn't very handy right there.

Q. You could have moved over to the left,
couldn't you, your left, the south side of this
high,vay¥

A. I could, yes sir.
Q. As a matter of fact, if you had gone down
on the south side of the highway on your left
this vehicle never would have struck you, would
I·t~.

A. It might not have, I didn't know that.
(R. 147)
He said he was on the oiled highway at all times as
he ran to the west toward the approaching car (R. 127)
and that at the time he was hit he could have been as
close as 50 feet from his parked truck. (R. 50)
Roland Reese testified that he was a state highway
p.atrolman, that he visited the scene of the accident the
next day (R. 160). He made some observations at the
scene of the accident. He stated the guard posts near
the culvert were right near the hard surface portion
of the highway; that the highway was 21 feet wide;
that the guard posts were about the width of the highway apart (R. 162-3). He stated he found tire tracks
114 feet 6 inches long on the paved portion of the road
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going in a diagonal course over to the left side of the
highway facing east; that they then went off the paved
portion and for 30 feet they continued on the dirt
shoulder until they went off the road entirely down the
embankment into the creek; that the tire marks off the
p1aved portion showed the ·car was skidding sideways
(R. 166) :and that those appeared right over the culvert
(R. 167).
He stated at the point the tire tracks first appeared
south of the culvert they were astraddle the center of
the highway (R. 169). He stated he visited the scene
on April 6th, three days after the accident. He further
stated the m~arks on the highway indicated a tire sliding
on the road (R. 174).
Several witnesses testified about arriving at the
scene of the accident. Muder's automobile (which had
struck plaintiff) was north of the highway down over
the embankment and somewhat east of the place where
plaintiff's truck was still iparked on the highway (R.
179). Plaintiff had been knocked into the creek and was
brought out by the witness Willis (R. 177). Muder told
one of these witnesses he was driving awful fast and
he hit Earley awful hard. Some more ·conversations are
detailed at (R. 184 and 185).
One witness stated he drove 1a car past the parked
truck without getting off the highway (R. 184). He
stated the Muder ·car was off the road about 25 feet east
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of the high,vay and in the slough facing the highway
(R. 198). He observed tracks on the highway starting
about 100 feet '""est of the culvert and continuing e1ast
(R. 202) and to the north until they came opposite to
a point vvhere the pickup truck vvas parked by Earley,
where the tracks indicated the rear end of the Muder
vehicle had swung around on the shoulder and then
down into the slough east of the -creek (R. 203).
It was agreed the Johnson truck ~as driven by
plaintiff was 151;4 feet front bumper to the rear of the
bed of the truck and from the front bumper to the
farthest portion of the rear tire was 131;4 feet (R. 215).
The sheriff of the county testified he visited the
scene the day following the accident; that he noticed tire
marks in the highway commencing in the south (or eastbound lane) ; that they traveled about 10 feet in the
south or east bound lane; that they continued to the
northeast; that they got off the oiled road 130 fee from
where they started to turn out of the south lane and
that it was 144 feet 6 inches from where the marks
started to the point where the Muder car came to rest
north of the high--w:ay and in the slough (R. 219, et seq).
The sheriff identified Exhibit 3, being a picture of the
Muder truck as it appeared when he saw it the morning
following the accident (R. 226).
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Elijah Willis (R. 227) testified about leaving home
and going over to the highway and seeing the accident
happen. It was he who found !plaintiff in the water in
the stream and it was he who got Earley out of the
stream and up to the highway.
He picked up Earley's hat and gloves on the edge
of the oiled road at a guard rail post 45 feet from where
he picked Earley up out of the ·creek (R. 233).
Muder ( R. 248) testified on the day in question he
was 24 years old; that he was employed by the defendant
as a salesman; that he was in the process of driving in
his employer's automobile from his residence on Bear
Lake to Laketown on some business of his employer
when the accident occurred (R. 251). He had been
over this highway many times before, having worked
1n the neighborhood for sometime (R. 252).
He stated after he passed the curve about one-half
mile west of the culvert where Big ·Creek passes under
the highway, he was traveling around 45 miles per hour;
maybe a little more. His headlights were on high beam
(R. 233-4). After he got on the st:r~aight aw,ay he noticed
some headlights facing him up at Laketown. (This was
beyond the culvert in the direction he was traveling).
As he proceeded along he noticed a small light; and
when he saw that he started to brake down. Then he s·aw
the truck across the highway and he could tell his lane
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,vas blocked. He turned left into the north lane, slowing
down and got to a jp.oint "~here he was certain he ·could
get past the truck "~hen the man moved up in his headlights \Yith his hands over his head running toward him
(R. 255). \Vhen he saw the man in front of him he hit
his brakes hard and he Inight have cut back to avoid the
man; his truck went into a skid and he slid down the
embankment on the east side of the creek (R. 256).
When he came to rest he was about ·6 feet below the
level of the road (R. 257). From the time he saw the
light and the truck his attention was directed on it and he
kept his eyes on it (R. 257). He estimated he was 30
to 40 feet from the truck when the truck struck Earley
and after striking Earley the truck went into a skid
and down the embankment. It did not tip over. He
got out of the truck ·a.nd saw a n1an standing over across
the stream (the witness Willis) and got there just as
Earley was being pulled out of the stream (R. 258). He
stated the highway was damp as he approached the creek
and there was mist rising from the creek (R. 261) but
this latter statement is contr·ary to the other witnesses.
Exhibit 3 was identified as a picture of his truck
after the accident and he stated the dent shown in the
front of the truck was caused when Muder was struck
(R. 262). At the time of the collision no part of his
vehicle was to the left of the oiled portion of the high-

way.
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His cross examination w~a.s essentially the same. He
stated visibility was good (R. 265); that he had no particular memory of having looked at the speedmeter but
he gauged his speed by reason of his experience with the
vehicle and how it operated (R. 266-7). He stated he
was blinded by no lights. When asked he testified he
was 200 or 300 feet from the ·culvert when he first sraw
the low light (the headlight on the parked truck) (R.
268) which light a;p,peared to be in the center of the highway; that he then applied his brakes (R. 269); that in
his judgment he was going 25 miles per hour when he
saw Earley in front of him; that he traveled probably
fifty feet from the time he first noticed the low light
(R. 270) until he recognized the truck racross his lane;
that he got the impression the car was pointed north
and east; that he then ap·plied his brakes a little more;
that the parked vehicle appeared to be up to the center
line of the highway (R. 271); that Earley w:as from 30
to 50 feet from ·the ·parked truck when he got hit; that
when he first saw Earley, Earley appeared to be in the
center of the road (R. 272); that Earley was 15 or 20
feet in front of him (R. 277); that he hit Earley with such
force ra.s to damage the grille and the front portion of
the hood and he knocked or carried him into the creek
(R. 278).
Muder further testified (.and this was the only
positive evidence one way or another) that the truck
driven by Early had no side lights nor reflectors on the
sides (R. 283).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
At the close of the evidence defendant moved for
a directed verdict (R. 285) and rene,ved that motion by
motion for judgment not"ithstanding the verdict (R. 8).
Both motions were denied and this appeal followed.

POINTS.
The facts m this case show the iplaintiff to be
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
and he cannot recover.

ARGUMENT.
The plaintiff parked his automobile 1n the nighttime crosswise of the highway. At the point where
he parked his car a stream crossed the highw,ay from
south to north, and there was a six £oot embankment down to the bed of the stream. He parked
his car, not by stopping parallel on the highway, hut
by backing around so that his vehicle w~as almost
squarely :across the eastbound or south p·ortion of
the highway and pointed slightly east of n·orth. The
rear of the vehicle was at the edge of the south
shoulder and the ·front edge of the vehicle was but
inches from the center of the highway. The hard
surfaced portion of this highway was 21 feet wide,
and for some distance on either side of where this
plaintiff parked his truck guard posts were erected
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alongside the edge of the hard surfaced road, so that
the shoulders were beyond the guard posts, narrowing the highway for vehicular traffic to 21 feet as
the shoulders could not be used.
The headlights were pointed slightly east of north
and the rear end of the vehicle was hanging out over
the edge of the highway toward the south. The headlights were across the highway with nothing to intersect them or refleet them onto the highway and the
tail light was shining off to the south. The side of
this vehicle was facing the direction from which
defendant's automobile 'approached, and no flares, sidelights nor reflectors were on the vehicle nor placed in
the vicinity. The ~parking of this vehicle in this fashion was entirely for the convenience of the plaintiff.
His only purpose in so parking was s,o he could more
·conveniently unload his vehicle into the bed of the
stream.
In thus parking his vehicle the plaintiff offended
against Section 57-7-165, Utah Code, reading:
''Upon any highway outside of a business
or residence district no person shall stop, park
or leave standing any vehicle, whether ~attended
or unattended, upon the paved or main traveled
part of the highway when it is practical to stop,
park or so leave such vehicle off such. ,p~art of
said highway, but in every event an unobstructed
width of the highway ,opposite a standing vehicle
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shall be left for the free passage ·of other
vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicle
shall be available from a distance of 200 feet
in each direction upon such highway.''
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Huston v.

Robinson (1944), 13 N. W. (2) 885 had this to say
about a statute similar to the ·above quoted section:
''On the ·other hand, there is danger ·of be.ing struck from the rear when one stops his
car because of- poor visibility on a highly trav.:led highw-ay. The law imposes certain requirements upon a driver in thus blocking the high. way. The purpose of the statute ;hereinbefore
:J_uoted is to keep the highway free from obstructions by standing vehicles. The requirement in
that respect is positive unless cireumstances
exist which make moving of the vehicle off the
paved, improved or main traveled portion of
the highway imp~racticable. ''
The California Supreme Court 1n Thomson v.

Bayless (1944), 150 Pacific (2) 413 in construing and
applying a section of the California motor vehicle
code exactly similar to Section 57-7-165, states:
''A violation of this section, designed to
protect persons traveling on the highway, constitutes negligence by the operator of the
vehicle. * * * The evidence shows the truck
and trailer were parked 'outside of a business
or residence district * * * upon the paved or
improved or main traveled p·ortion of the highway' within the meaning of section 582, and
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defendants do not dispute this fact. It follows, therefore, insofar as defendants' negligence is concerned, the only question to be
determined is whether or not it was 'practicable' for Bayless to park off the highway.
''Although it may be inconsistent with general rules of statutory ·construction, * * * the
courts in this state have uniformly held for
the past 12 years that :a prima facie case of
negligence is establ~shed under section 582 by
proof that the vehicle was left on the paved
portion of the highway outside of a business or
residential district and that the burden to show
that it was not practicable to drive off the main
traveled portion of the highway rests upon the
O~)ier:ator of such vehicle.''
Paragraph (13) of Section 57-7-167 prohibits the
stopping, standing or parking of a vehicle upon any
bridge or other elevated structure. This plaintiff
parked his car on the portion of the highway where
it was narrowest, where there was a steep embankment six feet or more in height from the level of
the highway to the stream, and he had parked it immediately on top of the ·culvert or opening under the
highway through which the stream flowed. Add to
this the guard p·osts erected and in place along the
highway at that point and one h~as the highway passing over a stream on the equivalent of a bridge.
In addition to the plaintiff's negligence in the
way he parked his car as shown above, the record
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shows that he took no steps 'vhatever to warn any
on-coming traffic of the presence of his truck on the
traveled portion of the highway.
Section 57-7-191, Utah Code, requires, when there
is insufficient light to reYeal any person or ohject
within a distance of 500 feet upon such highway, a
vehicle parked or stopped shall be equipped with one
or more lamps ''"~hich shall exhibit a white light on
the roadway side visible from a distance of 500 feet
to the front of such vehicle and a red light visible from
a distance of 500 feet to the rear.''
At the time of this accident there was insufficient
light to reveal a person or object 500 feet down the
highway. The proof was it was nighttime and totally
dark, and ~he defendant, taking the worst . of the
evidence against him, did not observe the truck until
he was about 250 feet away from it. The headlights
on plaintiff's vehicle as it was parked constituted no
warning of any kind and were not ''on the roadway
side", as the headlights were pointed away from the
approaching automobile. The place where the truck
was parked was six feet or more above the level of
the surrounding land, and there were no trees or
other obstructions off the side of the road which
would reflect the headlights of the parked vehicle
(exhibit 2). No red lights were showing to the rear
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at -all. The evidence is uncontroverted there were no
reflectors on the side of plaintiff's truck. Clearly the
plaintiff violated the provisions of the above statute.
The court's attention is further called to the provisions of 57-7-212 and 57-7-213, which show a clear
legislative intent that people operating trucks should
give -a maximum warning to other users of the highway in the event they are compelled to stop on the
high:way or the shoulder of the highway in the nighttime. These statutes require the carrying and, in the
event of being disabled, exhibiting of flares, lanterns
or reflectors at stated distances in front of :and behind
a truck stopped upon the highw-ay or shoulder thereof.
It is submitted that when such duties :are put
upon innocent operators of trucks whose trucks .break
down at thn~s and places beyond their control that
similar warning devices or some [)irecautions or warnings must be made by plaintiff under the circumstances
of his parking :as shown in this case. Here the plaintiff had full control of the situation. He could select
the spot at which he wished to stop, he knew how
long he would obstruct the highway and he appreciated
at the time that he was creating a dangerous situation :and a hazard to himself and others on the highway. Notwithstanding all this the defendant did nothing to warn other traffic.
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All these statutes 'Yhich deal with the manner
and time a person may park a truck upon the highway point to the fact that the law regards parking
and stopping of trucks on rural highways, especially
at nighttime, as creating a hazardous situation. Highways are meant for travel purposes, not for the parking of vehicles or for the unloading of them, particularly at nighttime. It was a highly dangerous and
negligent situation which ;p·laintiff set up that night.
It was fr.aught with danger to himself and all others
using that highway.
Situations where trucks or automobiles have been
parked upon the traveled portion of the highway, or
even on the shoulders, and where it is night time,
have come before the courts on many occasions and
they have uniformly held that the failure to have the
vehicle properly lighted or to put ·out flares is negligence per se. In the case of Newton vs. Pacific Highway Transport Co., 139 Pac. (2) 725 (Wash. 1943),
where there was a fact dispute as to whether or not the
truck occupied the traveled portion of the highway,
the court said that if the jury reconciled this conflict
against the truck driver, that such parking would be
negligence per se. We quote :
"As to the de;pth it so extended, the evidence is in conflict. It encroached at least to
the middle of the south lane, and there is evidence from which the jury could find that it
extended to within two feet of the center line
of the pavement. Intending to remain there
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but a few moments, the driver
flares. Conceding that it was
p·ark in any other manner, the
out flares, since it was dark,
violation of the statutes, and,
gence per se. ' '

did not put out
not possible to
omission to put
w:as of itself a
therefore, negli-

A similar decision was reached m Duncam, vs.
Madrid, 101 Pac. (2} 382 (N.Mex. 1940) and in Barone,
et al vs. Jones, et al, 177 Pac. (2) 30 (Cal. 1947).
Failure to have lights showing on the car parked,
stopped but n~t dis:abled, is held to be a violation of
a statute similar to Utah's and therefore negligence.

Hall, et ux vs. Associated Oil Co., et: al, 65 Pac. (2)
954. Paulsen, et .al vs. Spencer, 177 Pac. (2) 597, and
in Hine vs. Leppard, 42 Pac. (2) 389, the court stated
as follows:
"The California Vehicle Act (Deering's Gen.
Laws (1931 Ed.) Act 5128, sec 106) required
th_g truck to 'carry at the rear a lighted lamp
exhibiting a red light plainly visible under
normal :atmospheric conditions for a distance
of five hundred feet toward the rear. * * * '
Had the truck displayed- such a light, the plaintiff might have seen it in time to have avoided
the ,collision. It was not necessary for him
to have stopped. Had he seen the truck in
time, he could have gone around it."
In Ashley vs. Safeway, Inc., 47 P.ac. (2) 53, the
court stated:
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''The evidence discloses th:at the truck was
partly upon the gravel shoulder and partly upon
the paved or oiled portion of the road, so that
a car approaching from its rear and upon
that side of the road would have to turn out
toward the center of the road in order to pass
safely around it. There were no lights burning
on the truck either front or back. * * * * ''
''There is no merit in the contention that
any negligence on the part of Ballard had
expended itself prior to the accident. His negligence in allowing the unlighted truck to stand
upon the highway in the dark continued as
long as he left it standing there in that man. ner. It is true, as defendant points out, that,
while motion is the law of the road, Kitt was
not entitled to assume that the highway would
·be at all times unobstructed in the line of his
travel. Morton v. Mooney, 97 Mont. 1, 33 P.
(2d) 262. Kitt vvas entitled to assume that a
truck standing upon the highway at night would
display lights both upon the front and rear
thereof. Section 1753, Rev. Codes Mont. 1921,
· provides in part as follows: 'During the period
between one hour after sunset and one hour
before sunrise, every motor vehicle * * ·* shall
display two white lights in front * * * and one
light in the rear.' A violation of this statute
constitutes negligence. Simpson v. Miller, 97
M·ont. 328, 34 P. (2d) 528. ''
In G.reisen vs. Robins, et ux, 216 Pac. ( 2) 210
(Wash. 1950), where a statute similar to the Utah
statute was construed, the court stated the case as
follows:
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"The res~}ondent parked his car, on the
night of September 18, 1948, outside the city
limits of Seattle, so that it extended two feet
onto the traveled, hard-surfaced portion of the
highway. At this point, the pavement was
twenty-one feet wide with four and one-half
foot shoulders on each side. The automobile was
unlighted. This was negligence per se, being in
violation of Rem. Rev. Stat., Vol. 7A, Sec. 6360110, P.P.C. Sec. 295-71, and Rem. Rev. Stat.,
Vol. 7A, Sec. 63'60-19, P.P.C. Sec. 291-11."

* * * ''Accordingly, we hold that the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence,
as a matter of law, and that the trial court
erred in not granting the motions to dismiss
and for judgment n.o.v.''
Plaintiff appreciated the gra:vity of the situation
he created.

He admitted he had effectively blocked
one lane of the highway (the lane in which the
a:pproaching vehicle was operating).

He admits he
knew he was taking a chance when he p arked his
1

vehicle in that fashion and that he was creating a
dangerous situation on the highway. He als'o admitted
he knew that the approaching car, in order to get
around him, would have to go over on the north half
of the highway, and he stated he appreciated that
fact at the time. He also stated that knowing all that
he went west on the north h~alf of the highway, right
into the face of the oncoming automobile, which automobile gave no indication to him that it was going
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to slow dow·n or 'vas slowing down. Nothing the
plaintiff could have done would have made it more
dangerous for him.
The defendant's automobile took a perfectly normal course under the circumstances. The pl!aintiff
had blocked one-half the highway. It is perfectly
natural that the driver of the approaching vehicle
should turn to the left to avoid the truck and continue
along the highway. In view of the evidence in this
case, it is the only thing any person would expect to
happen. The statute requires that sufficient of the
highway remain open for the passage of vehicles, and
the defendant's vehicle had the right· to turn to the
left and proceed over the unblocked portion of the
highway, Paulsen vs. Spencer, S1J)pvra. There was at
that time no approaching traffic from the east which
would make such a turn dangerous or improper. And
the plaintiff expected that to happen as he knew the
situation better than anyone-he had created it. In view
of the speed at which plaintiff claimed defendant's
truck was traveling, and the further fact that plaintiff states defendant showed no indication of ever
slowing down, there was nothing plaintiff could expect
defendant to do except turn to the left and proceed
past the parked car on the unblocked portion of the
highway. All this the i>laintiff knew, and yet he
ran down the highway on the only side left open for
passage in an attempt to warn of the danger he had
created.
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The plain tiff in this action was not only negligent in parking his vehicle in the manner and at the
place in which he did, but he was negligent in pursuing the course he followed in his effort to extricate himself and to give warning of the dangerous condition which
he erected and brought into being upon the highway.
We refer this court to the case of· Keller v. Brenemarn (Wash. 1929), 279 Pacific 588. In that case it
appeared plaintiff's truck became stalled on the highway when it ran out of gasoline. He left it with one
corner protruding 2 or 3 feet over the .center of the
highway. He then started out looking for someone
to get some gasoline, and was walking near the center
of the highway when he was struck by an ~automo
bile. At the time he was struck he was walking toward
the automobile which struck him. This automobile had
come over the top of a grade in the road, on the
right side of the highway, and it swerved to the left
.and struck the plaintiff and his parked truck.
The Supreme Court of Washington held that
the plaintiff was negligent, first in running out of
gasoline, as he knew how far he was going to go and
should have p·repared himself, second in leaving his
truck in the position he did on the highway contrary
to a statute ·of the state of Washington, .and that

* * * ''when the appellant left the truck to go
upon his errand, he became a pedestrian, subject to the statutes applicable to p·edestrians
traveling on the public . highways.''
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The court :points out that a statute of Washington
required pedestrians to travel along the left side of
a highway and that the appellant gave no heed to
this statute. It also sets out that viol~ation of a statute in "\Vashington is negligence in law. It sustained
a holding by the trial court that plaintiff was barred
from recovering by reason of his contributory negligence.
Section 57-7-78.5 (d) defines a pedestrian as "any
person afoot".
Comparatively recently, this court has decided
three cases involving people ·on foot on the highway.
They are

Re.id v. Owens (1939), 93 Pacific (2) 680, 98
Utah 50;
Mingus v. Olsson (1949), 201 Pac. (2) 495,

Sant v. Miller (1949), 206 Pac. (2) 719.
In Reid v. Owens, the injured person left a trench
In the street in which he was working and crossed
the highway on an errand and was struck and killed.
This court said he had a duty to observe and stated
''He either :proceeded without looking or, having seen the approaching car, he chanced crossing in face of the hazard. The approaching
vehicle was at the instant of deceased's entry
onto the pavement so near that no prudent
p·erson would attempt crossing in front of it.
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The more reasonable inference is that he did
not see the car. But had he looked he would
have seen it, and he is charged with knowledge
of what he would have seen had he the duty to
look. We think that he clearly had such duty."

Mingus v. Olson. The deceased was struck on a
cross-walk in Salt Lake City. There was evidence he
did not look, and the court remarks that on the evidence it ''must be said as a matter of law that
deceased either failed to look, or having looked, failed·
to see what he should have seen.''
Sanf} v. Miller involved a pedestrian crossing a
street in Logan not at a crosswalk. He was struck

when not looking and the court held it his duty to
look. This language of the court we think pertinent:
'' Ap·pellant was aware of the :fact that he
was taking a chance in crossing the street at
a place ·contrary to law. He should also have
known that a driver of a vehicle would not ordinarily anticipate the presence of pedestrians on
the street at the time and place of the accident.
* * * Having omitted to continue to watch, he
failed to exercise the degree of care required
of a pedestrian who leaves a place of safety
and places himself in a position of peril. A
greater degree of care is necessary upon the
·part of a pedestrian who undertakes to cross
a city street at a prohibited place than is placed
on one who uses a marked crosswalk. And
especially is this true when because of darkness
and climatic conditions, the opportunity for
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uals on the road,Yay is greatly restricted. It
is not due care for a pers~on to fail to observe
what might be approaching danger when there
is no necessity to look elsewhere. Appellant
"""as not confronted with a situation which distracted his attention or which precluded him
from continuously observing the oncoming
traffic. * • • ' '
The holdings of this court in these three cases
were that the injured and deceased persons were
guilty of contributory negligence precluding recoveries,
because of failure to look or observe what was there
to be -seen.
On the facts none of the above cases are as strong
as the one at bar. This plaintiff by his own testimony
stated:
(a)

He saw the oncoming automobile;

(b) He knew and appreciated only one lane of
travel was open for it to proceed;
(c) He was aware defendant's vehicle was continuing and would continue- it was not diminishing
its speed as· far as he was concerned;
(d) He took a position on the only part of the
highway the approaching automobile could travel upun;
(e) He had op;portunity to avoid the accident
at any time up until he was struck by stepping off
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the travelled portion of the highway. (Defendant's
automobile never left the paved portion of this highway until opposite the parked truck, as shown by
the tr~a,cks.)
Section 57-7-146, Utah Code, reads:
'' (b) Where sidewalks are not provided any
pedestrian walking along and upon a highway
shall. when practicable walk only on the left side of
the roadway or its shoulder facing traffic which
may ap~)lroach from the opposite direction.''
In view of the above section of the Utah Code,
defendant had an absolute right to proceed on the
assumption that any person walking down the highway
in the vicinity of this parked truck, or otherwise,
would proceed toward the defendant on the south
edge of the road. It was the plaintiff's failure to abide
by the provisions of this statute and his failure to
proceed towards · the defendant on the south edge of
the road, and also the ~ilaintiff's failure to proceed
·on the shoulder of the road, facing traffic which might
approach him from the opposite direction, which placed
the pl~a.intiff in such position that he was struck by
defendant's vehicle. Had plaintiff obeyed that statute
no accident would have happened. But no, he took a
course which could lead to nothing but extreme danger
for himself in an attempt to give warning of a peril
and emergency which he had created. This plaintiff
might just as well have run down a railroad track into
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the path of an approaching train he knew would not
stop. He '•hoped'' the ap~proaching automobile would
stop, but nothing he saw or hea.rd gave him any indication it was going to stop.
The plaintiff's conduct in this case is so novel
and unique in its various aspects that the writers of
this brief have been unable to find any case specifically
in point covering his conduct in running down the
highway towards the defendant's automobile. It is
submitted, however, that the following rule as a matter
of general principle derived from the many many cases
cited in support of it, controls in such a situation. We
quote from Section 121 of 65 C. J. S. on Negligence,
page 727, et seq. :
''One who kn·ows and appreciates, or in the
exercise of ordinary care should have known
and appreciated, the existence of danger from
which injury might reasonably he anticipated
must exercise -ordinary care to avoid such injury.
One must also exercise ordinary care to avoid
the consequences of another's negligence. Thus,
where the defect or danger is patent or obvious,
it is contributory negligence to fail to exercise
ordinary care to avoid it. Conduct involving an
undue risk of harm to the actor is contributory
negligence, and one who by his voluntary acts
or omissions exposes himself to danger ~of which
he has actual or imputed knowledge is guilty
of negligence, if, under the same or similar
circumstances, an ordinarily prudent person
would not have incurred the risk of injury
which such conduct involved. The rule is equally
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applicable to one who, having taken a position
of danger without knowledge and appreciation
thereof, thereafter becomes fully cognizant of
the danger and continues to expose himself to it.''
The plaintiff cannot claim that his conduct under
the circumstances of this case is to be tested against
a background of sudden emergency or sudden peril
because one who creates the emergency or sudden
peril himself cannot take advantage of it as one of
the surrounding circumstances to avoid a charge of
contributory negligence. We quote from Section 41,
Acts in Emergency or Sudden Peril in 38 Am. Jur.
on Negligence, page 687 :
''Moreover, one placed in sudden danger by
reason of an emergency is held resiponsible for
error of judgment, if his own negligent, reckless, or wanton conduct contributed to cause
the emergency. ·One who is at fault in bringing
about an emergency is necessarily at fault ~s to
the injurious consequences thereof. The rule
that when one faced with sudden peril is compelled to act instinctively, he is not held to
the exercise of the same degree of care as if
:he had time for reflection, cannot he invoked by
one who has brought the emergency upon himself by his own wrong or who has not used due
care to avoid it. * * * * Before one can absolve
himself from liability for injury caused by acting upon emergency to save himself from harm,
he must show not only that an emergency existed
which was brought about by no negligent act
of his own but also that the resultant injury
could not have been prevented after the peril
to him .had ceased. ''
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Utah recognizes that one is not relieved by reason
of emergency or 1peril which he creates himself. We
quote from Harris vs. Parks, 58 Utah 42, 196 Pac 1002
at page 45 of the Utah Reports:
"\'Vhere one is confronted with threatened
danger and is suddenly in an emergency not
created by himself, called upon to determine on
his course of action, he is not held to the same
care and degree of caution that he might be
under different circumstances." (Italics ours)
This proposition was ·brought specifically before
the District Court of Appeal of the State of California
in Yates vs. Marotti, et oil, 8 Pac. (2) 519, where the
court said:
''The doctrine which may excuse one for a
lack of sound judgment with respect to his conduct when he is suddenly confronted with imminent peril has no application to one who has
brought the emergency upon himself by his
own willful, reckless, or negligent conduct. The
rule applies to one who, without fault on his
own part, finds himself suddenly confronted with
imminent peril. ·Rush v. Lagomarsino, 196, Cal.
308, 237 P. 1066 ; Neff v. United Railroads, 188
Cal. 722, 207 P. 243; Brooks v. City of Monterey,
106 Cal. Ap~~. 649, 657, .290 P. 540; Gootar v.
Levin, 109 ·Cal. App. 703, 293 Pac. 706; 3-4
Huddy's Enc. of Auto. Law (9th Ed.) 348, Sec.
182; 19 Cal. Jur. 602, Sec. 38; 42 C. J. 891,
Sec. 592. The doctrine of 'imminent peril' IS
therefore no excuse for the accident.''
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Under the circumstances, men of reasonable minds
could not differ as to the conduct of the plaintiff.
With full knowledge of the danger to himself he proceeded directly into the face of an approaching automobile, which was under his observation at all times.
He could have avoided the injury by simply stepping
aside to the north edge of the highway, as the physical
evidence ·Of the tire track shows that the defendant at
no time prior to his passing the parked truck left the
oiled 1portion of the highway. As we have previously
stated, the plaintiff knew that the only open lane of
traffic was the one he was proceeding in ~and he knew,
or unquestionably should have known, that the defendant would move into that lane to pass the plaintiff's parked truck. The plaintiff further admits that
there were no indications at any time that the defendant saw him or was taking any steps to avoid him or
to take any steps to stop. Plaintiff knew, or should
have known, that with the highway obstructed by his
truck the defendant's attention would he focused mainly

.

on safely passing through the opening left between
the front of the truck and the poles erected at the left
edge of the oiled 'surface of the highway and that· it
was reasonably forseeable that defendant would not
observe plaintiff until it was late to avoid him. Yet in
spite of the situation, plaintiff proceeded directly into
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the face of the oncoming automobile. There is no question of fact to be submitted to a jury as to plaintiff's
conduct being negligent and proximately contributing
to his injuries.

CONCLUSION
We submit that for all practical purposes the
plaintiff blocked one-half of the highway with his truck
and then blocked the other half of the highway with
himself. The situation developed under his observation at all times. He knew of the approach of the
automobile for over half a mile. He knew the entire
situation he had erected, then he took the position on
the highway occupying the only path which he had
left open for travel. J~dging the conduct of the plaintiff up to the time he parked his vehicle and started to
unload it, and also from the time he left his vehicle
and went down the highway, or judging the conduct of
the plaintiff on the basis of the situation as a whole,
it is inescapable that plaintiff's own acts contributed
to and produced the accident and injuries to himself.
These acts were careless and negligent in the extreme
and done in the face of known, approaching danger.
We submit that defendant's motion for a directed
verdict should have been granted because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant's
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motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
made after verdict, in which motion defendant renewed
his motion for a directed verdict, should also have been
granted. This case should be reversed with instructions to dismiss.
Respectfully submitted,

EDGAR C. JENSEN
ROBERT A. BURNS
ROBERT JOHN JENSEN

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

